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A GREEN ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT:
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
JONATHAN SKINNER*
INTRODUCTION
The intersection of environmentalism and economic
development is of growing interest and renewed prominence—as are
the tensions associated with balancing these interests. With the
collapse of the Doha negotiations in the summer of 2008, a fractured
chasm continues to grow between the developed and the developing
1
worlds. However, the conflicts do not evidence a failure of the
international trade regime; instead they signify the growing influence
and sophistication of developing states. The rise in influence of these
states, however, is viewed by some as a threat to environmental
conservation.
Skeptical states even proposed alternative
international organizations to address the perceived diverging
2
ambitions.
Nonetheless, environmentalists should not advocate
withdrawing from the trade-environment debate, but instead should
encourage sustainable development as an alternative to ostracizing
any group of Nations. This paper contends that the World Trade
Organization is the proper forum for greening the road to
development and bridging the interests of the developed and
developing worlds.
3
The Marrakesh Declaration of 1994 affirmed the establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), effectively transitioning the

* Duke University School of Law, J.D./LL.M. expected 2010; University of California,
Berkeley, B.A. 2006.
1. See, e.g., Collapse of Doha Round of Global Trade Talks Disappointing, Says Ban, UN
DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2008, at 2• 3, available at http://www.un.org/news/dh/pdf/english/2008/
30072008.pdf.
2. Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323,
343–46 (2002).
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
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international community from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
4
5
The historic
Trade (GATT) framework to the WTO system.
agreement of the WTO recognized the importance of integrating
developing countries into the international trade community whilst
6
also preserving the environment. The framers emphasized that
sustainable development is a primary objective, though the means
thereto should reflect the “needs and concerns” of countries “at
7
different levels of economic development.” Indeed the change in
language from GATT 1947 evidences negotiations recognizing “that
the objective of ‘full use of the resources of the world’ set forth in the
preamble . . . was no longer appropriate to the world trading system
8
of the 1990s.” Though not an explicitly binding obligation, the
preamble of the WTO does “add[] colour, texture and shading to [an]
9
interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement.”
The Marrakesh Agreement also created a permanent WTO
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) that “contribute[s] to
identifying and understanding the relationship between trade and
10
environment in order to promote sustainable development.”
In
practice, however, the problem of striking a balance between the
unique situations of developing countries and preserving
environmental values appears, in WTO case law, to be insoluble.
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1153, 1867 U.N.T.S.
190 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
5. World Trade Organization, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations iii-iv (1999).
6. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl. “Recognizing that [all parties’] relations
in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living . . . and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development.” Id.
7. Id.
8. Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 152, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp]. Compare
“Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living . . . and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
the production and exchange of goods,” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT 1947] (emphasis added), and “while allowing for the
optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development,” Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
9. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 153.
10. World Trade Organization, The Committee on Trade and Environment (‘Regular’
CTE), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/wrk_committee_e.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
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Historically, environmental regulations were viewed as a NorthSouth divide between developed and developing countries (or
between importing and exporting countries), whereby developing
countries were restricted from market access based on environmental
regulations. Initially, unilateral action by developed countries
improperly overstepped the boundaries of domestic regulations and
11
invaded national sovereignty.
Currently, politicians remark that
unilateral environmentally friendly measures might even create
environmentally harmful competitive advantages, such as pollution
12
havens in developing countries, where only through multilateral
agreements could developing countries be brought up to international
standards of environmental protection.
13
Though a World Environmental Organization (WEO) or even
14
an International Environmental Court (IEC) might be a satisfactory
forum to detangle the web of Multilateral Environmental
Agreements currently in effect, a WEO or an IEC is an unnecessary
addition to the global community. Instead, the WTO is adequately
structured to accommodate environmental concerns, does reference
environmental agreements, and is developing a greener
jurisprudence, even with respect to the unique concerns of developing
countries. As discussed below, the WTO is, in fact, the optimal
system to reconcile environmental protection and development.
Part I explains the establishment of the adjudicating bodies of
the WTO and discusses the sources of law from which adjudicators
derive duties and responsibilities. Part II explores the textual rules of
the WTO system, focusing primarily on GATT article XX(b), XX(g)
and the article XX chapeau, as the primary exceptions to a Member’s
11. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna I),
DS21/R – 39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted) [hereinafter U.S. – Tuna I].
12. But see Kevin C. Kennedy, Implications for Global Governance: Why Multilateralism
Matters in Resolving Trade-Environment Disputes, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 31, 49 (2001)
(“[E]conomic studies have shown that tough environmental standards at home do not, standing
alone, cause companies to relocate abroad. As Professor Edith Brown Weiss points out, there is
little empirical evidence to substantiate the claim that countries with lax environmental
standards attract foreign industries that are heavily regulated. Environmental costs are just one
factor among many that figure in the decision to make a foreign investment.”).
13. I have selected the acronym WEO, favored by Steve Charnovitz, A World Environment
Organization, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 330–31 (2002). For a discussion on the World
Environment Organization versus Global Environment Organization nomenclature see Sanford
E. Gaines, The Problem of Enforcing Environmental Norms in the WTO and What To Do
About It, 26 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 321, 324 n.16 (2003). Though stylistic
differences in terminology can be heavily debated, it is not within the scope of this paper.
14. See Audra E. Dehan, An International Environmental Court: Should There Be One?, 3
TOURO J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 52 (1992).
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WTO obligations that are frequently invoked in defense of
environmental regulations. Part III contextualizes the tensions
between development and environmental protection and addresses
several major concerns held by some developing countries. Finally,
Part IV examines the latest jurisprudence concerning environmental
regulations and developing countries, in particular the Appellate
Body report of Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
15
Tyres.
I. WTO COURTS AND SOURCES OF WTO LAW
The WTO was created through contractual agreements among
sovereign states, establishing a system of values embodied in rules
(the GATT) and a mechanism through which trade disputes could be
adjudicated (the courts). The General Agreement of the WTO
provides for two adjudicating bodies—the Appellate Body (AB) and
16
the panels. The bodies are not referred to specifically as courts in
the WTO agreements, but are “usually referred to in literature as
17
quasi-judicial bodies” with similar functions and bound by the same
restrictions as traditional courts. In discussing what law WTO
adjudicating bodies have used, there is a fine distinction between
sources of law and interpretive elements that inform the parties and
18
WTO courts in adjudication of disputes.
Professor Petros Mavroidis of Columbia Law School clearly
illustrated this distinction in the following chart (though it is by no
means an exhaustive list):
19
Sources of Law and Their Interpretative Elements
Sources of Law

Examples

Covered agreements:

DSU Appendix 1

Incorporated international
agreements:

Havana Charter

20

15. Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil – Tyres].
16. Petros C. Mavroidis, No Outsourcing of Law? WTO Law as Practiced by WTO Courts,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 421, 421–22 (2008).
17. Id. at 421 n.4.
18. Id. at 421.
19. Id. at 426.
20. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
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Agreements referred to in:
21
TRIPS Agreement
22
SCM Agreement
Secondary law:

Implied powers:

AuthoritativeInterpretations
Amendments
Waivers
Decisions
Recommendations
International agreements to
which WTO is a party
Allocation of burden of Proof
Amici participation
Extended third-party rights

Interpretive elements
Oxford English Dictionary
Travaux préparatoires of the WTO Agreement
Practice/agreements subsequent to WTO Agreement
GATT panel reports
WTO panel and AB reports
International agreements not incorporated into the WTO
Agreement
Acts adopted by various international organizations
Decisions by international courts
Domestic law and practice
Unilateral declarations by WTO members
Customary international law
General principles of law
Doctrine
Primary sources of law for the WTO adjudicating bodies are
limited to the covered agreements in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) and explicitly refer to incorporated

21. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
22. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14
[hereinafter SCM].
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23

international agreements. There is an implicit reference in the DSU
that the adjudicating bodies are bound under the provisions of the
24
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) which
“authorizes the use of extra-contractual . . . interpretative elements in
25
Though the rules
order to interpret an international contract.”
prohibit the Dispute Settlement Body (the body which adopts panel
and AB reports) from “add[ing] to, or diminish[ing] the rights and
26
obligations provided in the covered agreements,” the VCLT
explains that adjudicating bodies may use extra-contractual
provisions and understandings to interpret GATT articles. In fact,
the first AB decision under the WTO recognized article 31 of the
VCLT “as customary or general international law of interpretation
applicable also for WTO dispute settlement, stressing that WTO law
should not be ‘read in clinical isolation from public international
27
law.’”
Additional sources of general international law include
judicial decisions issued by the International Court of Justice; and,
though not binding on the parties in the WTO pursuant to VCLT
31.3, any relevant rules of international law are applicable to the
contextualization of the obligations within the WTO system,
including universally binding principles of customary international
28
law.
Prior to 1998, the panels and AB rarely invoked environmental
principles in determining the obligations of states party to a dispute
under the GATT. One major issue, however, did arise under GATT
29
article XX(g): whether living animals could be considered an
“exhaustible natural resource.” In 1991, the unadopted panel report
23. See Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 427.
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
25. Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 425; see also DSU, supra note 20, at art. 3.2. (“The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the
covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”).
26. Mavroidis, supra note 16, at 425 (quoting DSU, supra note 20, at art. 3.2).
27. Seventh Annual WTO Conference, WTO Dispute Settlement: Current Issues, The
GMOs Dispute, May 22–23, 2007, Interpreting WTO Law and the Relevance of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements in EC-Biotech, 2 (quoting Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 16, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter
U.S. – Gasoline]) [hereinafter EC-Biotech Conference Report].
28. VCLT, supra note 24, art. 31.3(c) (“any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties.”).
29. GATT 1994, supra note 4, at art. XX(g) (relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption).
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in U.S. – Tuna I avoided this discussion altogether by considering
instead the extraterritorial nature of the measures adopted by the
United States and determined that the U.S. measures were not
30
justified under article XX(g).
The panel held that the range of
policy exceptions under the GATT should be negotiated through
amendments or supplementary provisions to the GATT, not through
31
unilateral measures that impair trade. However, the panel and AB
under the newly implemented system of rules and considerations
32
reconsidered this issue in U.S. – Shrimp in October 1998.
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp “note[d] that the generic term ‘natural
resources’ in article XX(g) is not ‘static’ in its content or reference but
33
is rather ‘by definition, evolutionary’.” It then turned to the 1982
34
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to
define jurisdictional rights and determined that together with Agenda
35
36
21, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Resolution on
Assistance to Developing Countries (adopted in conjunction with the
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
37
Animals ), natural resources included non-living as well as living
38
resources. The AB also noted that the establishment of the CTE
evidenced the intention of the Ministers at Marrakesh to reflect the
39
principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
30. U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶ 5.34.
31. See id. ¶ 6.3.
32. US – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 152.
33. Id. ¶ 130 n.109 (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 31 (June 21) (explaining that treaty “interpretation cannot remain
unaffected by the subsequent development of law”)).
34. Id. ¶ 130 n.110 (“Done at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122; 21 International Legal Materials1261.”). The United States stated at oral
hearing that with respect to fisheries law, the UNCLOS reflects international customary law.
35. Id. ¶ 130 n.112 (“Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development, 14 June 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1.”).
36. Id. ¶ 130 n.111 (“Done at Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, UNEP/Bio.Div./N7-INC5/4; 31
International Legal Materials 818.”).
37. Id. ¶ 130 n.113 (“Final Act of the Conference to Conclude a Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, done at Bonn, 23 June 1979, 19
International Legal Materials 11, p.15 . . . [and noting] that Malaysia, Thailand and the United
States are not parties to the Convention.”).
38. Id. ¶ 131.
39. Id. ¶ 154 n.147 (“We note that Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration . . . states: ‘The right
to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs . . . .’ Principle 4 . . . states that: ‘In order to achieve sustainable development,
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and
cannot be considered in isolation from it.’”).
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40

and Agenda 21. In interpreting article XX(g), the AB looked to
several multilateral environmental treaties, including treaties which at
least one party to the dispute had not signed or had signed but had
41
not ratified.
In effect, U.S. – Shrimp confirmed that the WTO
system is not self-contained and should not be read in isolation of
international principles and developments in the law.
Despite the broader interpretive reach of U.S. – Shrimp, the
dispute settlement panel in EC – Measures affecting the Approval and
42
Marketing of Biotech Products “limited the application of article
31(3)(c) [of the VCLT] to the rules of international law applicable in
43
the relations between all the parties to the treaty being interpreted.”
The panel’s approach appears to deviate from previous jurisprudence
44
Though the relevance of
but was not ultimately appealed.
multilateral environmental agreements to WTO disputes is currently
under debate, it is indisputable that states jointly-party to any bi- or
multilateral agreements may not dodge their respective treaty
obligations. Nevertheless, if principles of international environmental
law crystallize into customary international law, the principles may be
incorporated into the WTO system as a source of law or a strong
interpretive element that the dispute settlement system may rely on
45
for purposes of security and predictability. However, even if the
adjudicating bodies do not consider the extra-contractual obligations
and interpretations, the GATT rules are independently well
constructed to accommodate environmental exceptions.
II. GATT 1994
The GATT provides general exceptions to the two core
principles of international trade, article I (Most-Favored-Nation
Treatment) and article III (National-Treatment Principle), through
invocation of GATT article XX. Though necessary to preserve nontrade values, the general exceptions to GATT obligations are limited

40. Id. ¶ 154.
41. See, e.g., id. ¶ 130 n.110• 13.
42. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29, 2006)
[hereinafter EC – Biotech].
43. EC-Biotech Conference Report, supra note 27, at 2.
44. See id. at 12.
45. DSU, supra note 20, art. 3.2 (“The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central
element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”).
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46

in scope and controversial. Specifically, article XX(b) and article
47
XX(g) are subject to ample dispute and discussion in academic
circles and have been the central issues of adjudication in many panel
and AB decisions. Despite hammering upon the exceptions, WTO
courts have forged a balancing mechanism to equitably weigh the
rights and duties of states invoking article XX. While states are
permitted to unilaterally enact environmental legislation, they may
not mask arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised
restrictions on international trade in a green agenda.
A. Article XX(b): Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or Plant Life
or Health
For a measure to fall within the scope of article XX(b), it need
only satisfy a two-part analysis: (1) Is the substance of the policy or
the measure in question the protection of human animal, or plant life
or health? and (2) Is the measure for which the exception is being
invoked necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health?
For a measure to be necessary and qualify under article XX(b), the
measure must be “among the measures reasonably available . . . , that
which entails the least degree of inconsistency with the other GATT
48
provisions.”
Additionally, “a panel must be satisfied that [the
measure] brings about a material contribution to the achievement of
49
its objective.” In analyzing the degree of contribution, there is “no
requirement under article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 to quantify, as
50
such, the risk to human life or health,” instead “[a] risk may be
51
evaluated either in quantitative or qualitative terms.”
In determining whether a measure is necessary within the
meaning of article XX(b), “a panel must consider the relevant factors,
particularly the importance of the interests or values at stake, the
extent of the contribution to the achievement of the measure’s

46. GATT 1994, supra note 4 (“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health”).
47. Id. (“relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”).
48. GATT Panel Report, United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, L/6439,
BISD 36S/345 (Jan. 16, 1989), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/87tar337.asp.
49. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151.
50. Appellate Body Report, European Communities•Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 167, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC –
Asbestos].
51. Id.
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52

objective, and its trade restrictiveness.” If a measure is deemed
necessary, it is then compared to alternatives that are reasonably
available while still “providing an equivalent contribution to the
53
achievement of the objective.”
article XX(b) provides broad
discretion to states to determine what measures are important to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health, but limits a State’s
ability to unfairly prejudice international trade with overreaching and
overly restrictive measures that are not necessary to the stated goals.
The exception inherently captures some of the language of the
chapeau in restricting unnecessary restrictions on trade by requiring
the lesser restrictive alternative measures should any be reasonably
available. The requirement does not prohibit a State from pursuing
policy objectives, nor does it endanger human, animal, or plant life or
health, but instead proscribes a State from breaching its general
obligations to the GATT in order to economically harm other
exporting states.
B. Article XX(g): Relating to the Conservation of Exhaustible Natural
Resources if Such Measures are Made Effective in Conjunction
With Restrictions on Domestic Production or Consumption
Interpreters of article XX(g) are required to look at the
relationship “between the measure at stake and the legitimate policy
54
of conserving exhaustible natural resources.” For purposes of article
XX(g), the protectionist measures should be “primarily aimed at”
conserving exhaustible natural resources such that a “substantial
55
relationship” exists between the rule and conservation. However,
“the phrase ‘primarily aimed at’ is not itself treaty language and was
56
not designed as a simple litmus test” for article XX.
“Without
abandoning the ‘primarily aimed at’ formula, [the WTO Appellate
Body] has construed that as requiring only a ‘substantial relationship’
57
between means and ends.”
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp determined that “[i]n its general design
and structure . . . [the U.S. measure] is not a simple, blanket
52. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 178.
53. Id.
54. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 135.
55. Id. ¶ 136 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 19).
56. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 268, 278–79 (1997) (citing U.S. –
Gasoline, supra note 27, at 19).
57. Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised
Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 739 n.61 (2001).
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prohibition . . . imposed without regard to the consequences (or lack
58
thereof) of the mode of harvesting . . . .” It then focused on the
design of the measure and determined that the “implementing
guidelines . . . [are] not disproportionately wide in [their] scope and
reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and
conservation . . . . The means are, in principle, reasonably related to
59
the end.”
Furthermore, in citing U.S. – Gasoline, the AB held that article
XX(g): “. . . is appropriately read as a requirement that the measures
concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported
60
[products] but also with respect to domestic [products].” Essentially,
the clause requires even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions,
61
in the name of conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
The requirements under article XX(b) and (g) are necessarily
broad and permit states to implement measures that deviate from the
core obligations in the WTO. However, once a measure falls within
the scope of one of the general exceptions, the measure must survive
the scrutiny of the chapeau. “[T]he chapeau serves to ensure that
Members’ rights to avail themselves of exceptions are exercised in
good faith to protect interests considered legitimate under article XX,
not as a means to circumvent one Member’s obligations towards
62
other WTO Members.”
C. Article XX Chapeau

63

While article XX(b) and (g) have been interpreted broadly, the
chapeau acts as a sieve, preventing disguised restrictions on
international trade from passing through the WTO rules and
regulations as justified environmental regulations. The AB in US –
Gasoline implemented a sophisticated and flexible analysis of article
XX, and found that though the U.S. program for gasoline quality
regulation was provisionally qualified under paragraph (g), the
64
measures as applied resulted in unjustifiable discrimination. The
report

58. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 141.
59. Id.
60. Id. ¶ 143 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 20-21).
61. Id.
62. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, at 215 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 22).
63. In international law, the chapeau is an introductory text appearing in a treaty that
broadly defines its principles, objectives, and background.
64. Gaines, supra note 57, at 759.
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would not turn on whether the trade measure addressed an
environmental issue covered by article XX(b) or (g) (Tuna –
Dolphin I), or even whether the effect of the measure on
environmental quality was direct or indirect (Tuna – Dolphin II).
The major issue would become whether the challenged government
had applied a measure within the scope of (b) or (g) in a way that
resulted in ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ contrary to the
65
conditions in the chapeau to article XX.

More importantly, the chapeau embodies the customary norm of
good faith and permits a Member to act so long as that Member does
66
not unreasonably abuse its rights under the WTO.
The chapeau does not explicitly describe measures that constitute
arbitrary, unjustifiable or disguised restrictions on international trade,
but the AB has provided examples that do constitute impermissible
restrictions on trade. The AB in U.S. – Shrimp explained that a
uniform standard otherwise acceptable for domestic regulations
breaches principles of international relations if one Member requires
another Member to “adopt essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force
within that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration
different conditions which may occur in the territories of those other
67
Members.” Additionally, the AB called for flexibility in a regulatory
program and ultimately concluded that the U.S. certification program
68
lacked transparency and violated principles of due process.
Even though many protectionist measures may be provisionally
justified under article XX(b) and (g), WTO courts have fashioned a
counterweight to prevent overuse of the General Exception. The
Court has stated that “the purpose and object of the introductory
clauses of article XX is generally the prevention of ‘abuse of the
69
exceptions . . . ‘“ and do not permit states to cloak arbitrary or
unjustifiable restrictions on international trade with protectionist
measures otherwise permissible under article XX(b) and (g). In
70
effect, the chapeau of article XX reigns in broad and sweeping
measures designed to preserve non-trade values that violate State
WTO obligations.
65. Id. at 759-60.
66. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 158.
67. Id. ¶ 164.
68. Id. ¶¶ 180-81.
69. Id. ¶ 151 (citing U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 27, at 22).
70. “Subject to the requirement that measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries . . . or a
disguised restriction on international trade . . . .” Id. ¶ 113.
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However, this should not be viewed as an affront to non-trade
values, but as an equitable balance of rights and duties preserved in
the structure of article XX. Members are permitted to enact
legislation and pursue regulations that have reasonable trade
restrictive effects so long as the measures do not violate the chapeau
of article XX.
Nevertheless, many developed countries have
attempted to conceal trade protectionist measures under green
legislation, leading developing countries to challenge the measures in
the WTO courts. It should not be assumed that developing countries
do not share similar environmental ambitions, but instead that they
rely on established WTO panels to determine whether “green
legislation” is in fact an invasive or disguised restriction on
international trade.
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
The majority of environmental regulation conflicts in WTO case
law are initiated by developing countries against more restrictive
measures adopted by developed countries. Developing countries are
concerned that green protectionist measures are merely disguised
barriers to international trade. The concerns of developing countries
fall into three broad categories: Abuse of Power (unilateral measures
“give governments greater power and opportunity in the free-trade
71
era to protect their own industries against foreign competition” );
Sovereignty (conflicts between extraterritorial regulations and
national sovereignty); and Economic and Social Costs (a lack of
understanding in developed countries “of the domestic
environmental, social, and economic context of developing
72
countries . . .” ). Though the concerns are reasonable, the WTO
system is well equipped to balance the interests of environmental
protection and development and even encourages sustainable
development as a primary objective in international trade.
A. Abuse of Power
A major concern held by many developing countries is that the
ability to institute unilateral environmental measures gives greater

71. Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After China’s WTO Accession, 32
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 62 (2007).
72. Id.
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73

power to developed states. Eco-imperialism, a term characterizing
developed countries’ imposition of environmental values upon
developing countries, has become a rallying call against unilateral
environmental measures. Because the measures frequently impose
stricter standards for environmental protection, developing countries
maintain that the gaps in environmental standards have resulted in
74
“green barriers” to trade.
To address the concern for divergent standards, the WTO
implemented the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS
75
Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
76
(TBT Agreement). The TBT and SPS Agreements “acknowledge
the importance of harmonizing standards internationally so as to
minimize the risk that sanitary, phytosanitary, and other technical
77
standards will become trade barriers. Standard harmonization not
only benefits developing countries by introducing internationally
sound research programs, but also strengthens the multilateral
78
framework for solving global environmental problems. Developing
countries are no longer hindered by complicated atypical programs
that would burden trade infrastructure and hamper international
trade because a collection of reliable international standards will
provide notice to states entering the international market. Because
all countries will be limited to internationally recognized and
approved standards, a State may not abuse the more vulnerable
infrastructure and economy of a developing country.

73. See generally John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992) (discussing various aspects of
eco-imperialism).
74. See Zhao, supra note 71, at 56–57.
75. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Jan. 1, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS].
76. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
TBT].
77. Zhao, supra note 71, at 57. “Both agreements are included among the Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods annexed to the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement . . . . SPS
Agreement Art. 3.1 states: ‘To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures on international
standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in
this Agreement . . . . TBT Agreement Art. 2.6 states: ‘With a view to harmonizing technical
regulations on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of
their resources, in the preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of
international standards for products for which they have either adopted, or expect to adopt,
technical regulations . . . .” Id. at n.67.
78. See id. at 57.
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TBT article 2.4 and SPS article 3.1 both require that Members
base any technical, sanitary, or phytosanitary measures on
international standards. article 3.1 of the SPS also limits the inquiry
to existing international standards and article 3.2 explicitly states that
any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that is based on an existing
international standard shall be deemed necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health, and presumed consistent with the SPS
Agreement and the GATT. However, note that the AB in EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products cautioned that
international standards and guidelines are not to be read as binding
79
norms.
The TBT, however, broadens the inquiry to any relevant
international standards or parts thereof and includes standards which
are not yet in existence so long as their completion is imminent. The
AB in EC – Trade Description of Sardines determined that standards
implemented by international standardizing bodies do not need to be
based on consensus, because TBT Annex 1.2 omitted any
80
requirement of consensus in the text. The AB then went on to
explain that in order to be relevant, the standards would have to bear
81
upon, relate to, or be pertinent to the regulation. Next, the relevant
standard should be the main constituent or fundamental principle of
82
the regulation imposed. It is then incumbent upon the complainant
to show that the standard relied on by the respondent Member is both
ineffective and inappropriate.
Unlike GATT article XX, TBT article 2.2 imposes affirmative
obligations on a contracting Member, requiring that technical
regulations “not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil [sic]
a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment [sic]
83
would create.” The preamble of the TBT requires that no measure
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between [countries] where the same
84
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade.”
Essentially, TBT article 2.2 constructs a similar framework embodied
in the relationship between the GATT article XX listed exceptions
79. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, ¶ 165,
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan.16, 1998) [hereinafter EC – Hormones].
80. Appellate Body Report, EC – Trade Description of Sardines, ¶ 227, WT/DS231/AB/R
(Sept. 26, 2002) [hereinafter EC – Sardines].
81. See id. ¶ 232.
82. Id. ¶ 245.
83. TBT, supra note 76, art. 2.2.
84. SPS, supra note 76, pmbl.
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and the chapeau. The legitimate objectives for the purposes of the
TBT are not limited as they are in GATT article XX; though an
objective pursued by any multilateral environmental agreement could
arguably be considered legitimate within the context of the TBT.
Nevertheless, article 2 of the TBT will not govern a measure that
is not a technical regulation but merely a technical standard. Under
the TBT, a technical regulation is a document that identifies a group
of products, stipulates or provides product characteristics (explaining
that the characteristics of a product include any objectively definable
85
feature or quality), and requires mandatory compliance.
Thus,
technical regulations within the TBT receive stricter obligations than
standards or conformity assessment procedures, because technical
regulations require mandatory compliance and therefore result in a
de facto trade embargo for noncompliance with the regulation.
Additionally, the TBT and SPS Agreements provide for
technical assistance to facilitate the implementation of article
provisions in the agreements. article 11 of the TBT explains that
developing countries may request advice “on the preparation of
86
technical regulations.” article 4 of the SPS Agreement introduces
the concept of “equivalence” as a reasonably acceptable alternative
measure to complying with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
Paragraph 8 of the Decision on Equivalence provides further that
Members shall give “full consideration to requests by another
Member, especially a developing country Member, for appropriate
87
technical assistance to facilitate implementation of article 4.” The
supplemental agreements strengthen the WTO’s commitment to
facilitating technological and intellectual capital investment in
developing countries.
Equivalence and technical assistance
encourages technologically advanced and sustainable development
whilst recognizing the special circumstances of developing countries.
B. Extraterritorial Regulation & Sovereignty: U.S. – Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna & U.S. – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products.
A related concern to the abuse of power is the issue of national
sovereignty.
Trade restrictive measures for the purposes of
85. EC – Asbestos, supra at note 50, ¶¶ 67-68.
86. TBT, supra note 76, art. 11.1.
87. SPS Comm., Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, ¶ 8, G/SPS/19 (Oct. 24, 2001) (emphasis
added).
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environmental protection may have extra-territorial effects and thus
infringe on national sovereignty by imposing values of developed
countries upon developing countries. The WTO courts are mindful of
international law limitations on policy-based national legislation and
have not disregarded the principle of sovereignty in dispute
88
resolution. However, the WTO Agreement is also committed to
sustainable development and permits a State to implement legislation
as part of national policy programs for the purpose of environmental
protection. What the courts need to decide, therefore, is where to
draw the line between policy-based exceptions to the general WTO
obligations and invasive extra-territorial legislation that breach the
rights of other member states. For measures based on environmental
protection, the WTO courts have three significant but divergent
opinions which address the issue.
89

1. U.S. – Tuna I & U.S. – Tuna II
In the Pacific Ocean, yellowfin tuna often swim beneath schools
90
of dolphins. Frequently, while harvesting tuna with purse seine nets,
91
dolphins are trapped in the nets and die (unless otherwise released).
The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) decreed that
dolphins were entitled to protection from harmful fishing techniques
and set standards for American fishing fleets and for countries whose
fishing boats catch yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical areas of the
92
Pacific Ocean. If a country exporting tuna to the United States
could not prove to trade inspectors that the tuna fishing methods met
standards set out in U.S. law, the United States would refuse entry of
93
the tuna products.
In January 1991, Mexico requested that the contracting parties of
GATT 1947 establish a panel to address U.S. restrictions on tuna
94
imports. Mexico argued that “the embargo provisions in MMPA . . .
were inconsistent with the general prohibition of quantitative
restrictions under article XI . . .” and that the MMPA “established

88. See, e.g., U.S – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6.2-6.4.
89. Panel Report, U.S. – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna II), GATT Doc. DS29/R
(June 16, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. – Tuna II].
90. WTO, Mexico etc. versus US: ‘tuna-dolphin’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
envir_e/edis04_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶ 1.1.
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discriminatory specific conditions for a specific geographical area, in
95
violation of article XIII . . . .”
Though the panel decision was not ultimately adopted (the panel
was convened prior to the Marrakesh Agreement in 1994), the
findings did acknowledge the deep concern for environmental
protection. The panel accepted the conservation goals of the U.S.
policy but found the import ban nevertheless violated core provisions
96
of the GATT. The panel held that articles XX(b) and (g) limited a
State to protecting the environment within the jurisdiction of its
97
government and not extra-territorially.
In 1992, the European Union filed its own complaint in U.S. –
98
Tuna II. The second panel report addressed the same U.S. measures
and the report was circulated in 1994. The second panel “found no
basis in the GATT or its negotiating history for such a jurisdictional
limitation on article XX . . . the panel concluded that the U.S. tuna
embargo did not [violate GATT] . . . because it did not protect the
dolphin resource directly but operated by putting trade pressure on
other governments to change their policies with respect to dolphin
99
protection.”
The second panel abandoned the implied jurisdictional
limitations for environmental measures in article XX but required
that measures qualifying under article XX(g) must be ‘primarily
100
aimed at’ the conservation of a natural resource.
2. U.S. – Shrimp
Many species of sea turtles have been identified and are
distributed around the world in subtropical and tropical waters.
Though the turtles migrate between foraging and nesting grounds,
101
much of their lives are spent at sea.
Because of increased human
contact with sea turtles, many turtle populations have been directly
(for their meat, shells, and eggs) or indirectly (through incidental
capture, habitat destruction, or water pollution) harmed. In response,

95. Id. ¶ 3.1(a).
96. See U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11, ¶¶ 6.3-6.4.
97. See id. ¶ 5.28.
98. U.S. – Tuna II, supra note 90, § I.
99. Gaines, supra note 57, at 757.
100. Id. For a discussion on the current test under GATT 1994, art. XX(g), see generally
Schoenbaum, supra note 57 (discussing the current test under GATT 1994, art. XX(g)).
101. WTO, India etc versus U.S.: ‘shrimp-turtle’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
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102

the United States passed the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973
and listed five species of sea turtles that passed through U.S. waters as
endangered or threatened. The Endangered Species Act prohibits
the “taking” of protected sea turtles in U.S. territory. The Act
specifically required U.S. shrimp trawlers to use “turtle excluder
devices” (TEDs) in their nets to reduce the likelihood of unlawful
“takings” of sea turtles during trawling expeditions. Section 609 of
U.S. Public Law 101-102, enacted in 1989, directly addressed the
importation of harvested shrimp that adversely affected protected sea
turtles and prohibited their sale in the United States. Furthermore,
section 609 required shrimp harvesting nations to certify a regulatory
program that would either reduce their incidental taking rate to levels
comparable to United States or prove that their harvesting did not
103
threaten protected turtles.
Between October 1996 and January 1997, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan and Thailand issued a joint request to “establish a panel to
examine their complaint regarding a prohibition imposed by the
United States on the importation of certain shrimp and shrimp
104
products.”
The AB in U.S. – Shrimp reaffirmed its rejection of the
traditional GATT approach of U.S. – Tuna I & II, and relied on the
U.S. – Gasoline report in recognizing the chapeau of article XX as the
critical test for a trade measure to qualify as an exception to the
105
general obligations.
Neither the appellant nor the appellee asserted exclusive
jurisdiction over the migratory turtles, at least not while the turtles
were freely swimming in their natural habitat, but the endangered
species of turtles at stake were known to pass through waters within
106
the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Appellate Body
concluded, without addressing the issue of jurisdictional limitations,
by determining that there was a “sufficient nexus between the
migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the
107
United States for purposes of article XX(g).”
However, the AB
noted that the United States had failed in good faith to negotiate

102. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533–1544 (2006).
103. WTO, India etc versus U.S.: ‘shrimp-turtle’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
envir_e/edis08_e.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2009).
104. U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶ 1.
105. See id. ¶¶ 118-19.
106. Id. ¶ 133.
107. Id.
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multilateral solutions and compromises prior to enacting the
108
legislation.
But, when the implementation panel revisited the U.S. measure
in U.S. – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
109
Recourse to article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, the panel and AB
found that the U.S. had in good faith attempted to negotiate an
international agreement with Malaysia (the complainant party) and
also included a flexible certification program that would have enabled
the U.S. to consider the particular conditions prevailing in other
110
member states. The AB therefore concluded that the measure was
neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable within the meaning of the chapeau
111
of article XX,
and that the U.S. was under no obligation to
conclude an international agreement but merely an obligation to
negotiate with the parties in the dispute for the protection of sea
112
turtles.
In international law, sovereignty is no longer an impenetrable
wall. The U.S. – Shrimp decision signifies the AB’s decision to depart
from heavy reliance on traditional international law rhetoric and
clarifies the states’ rights under the general exceptions to the
obligations of the GATT. Because the WTO Agreement is an
international contract among states, the WTO courts are increasingly
reluctant to rely on national sovereignty as an absolute shield to the
113
responsibilities of member states.
Measures may need to be
enacted to deal with certain international concerns such as global
climate change because some member states will be first to
experience the consequences of significant atmospheric changes.
Also, because many environmental measures are inherently trade
restrictive, the WTO System cannot be seen as a suicide pact that
prohibits Members from taking any precautionary measures or
instituting any regulations; rather, the regulations must be properly
constructed to prevent disguised or unnecessary restrictions on trade.
In a time of global financial crisis, reactive and inflammatory rhetoric
should not prompt protectionist legislatures to abstain from fulfilling
their state’s obligations to the international system—similarly with

108. Id. ¶ 171.
109. Appellate Body Report, U.S. – Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
110. Id. ¶ 153.
111. See id. ¶ 105.
112. Id. ¶ 123.
113. See, e.g., U.S. - Shrimp, supra note 8.
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global climate change, a Member should rely on international
negotiations and consensus before imposing restrictions that invade
the domestic legislatures of another Member State. With an eye
towards international negotiations or multilateral environmental
agreements, WTO courts may properly weigh the rights and duties of
member states to determine equitable but reasonable solutions to the
trade disputes.
C. Economic and Social Costs
It is debatable whether developed countries are the “proper
arbiters [of] how social, economic, and environmental matters are to
114
be dealt with . . . .”
In fact, WTO courts, as previously discussed,
have discouraged unilateral efforts of environmental regulation, as
115
Unilateral
have many international environmental bodies.
implementation results in ineffective and disparate regimes for
solving a global phenomenon. Additionally, unilateralism encourages
a downward spiral where countries are free to individually invoke
regulatory measures in the guise of environmental protection
resulting in a tangled web of disparate regimes that do not actually
address the problems of environmental degradation. Because the
effects of environmental pollution are not necessarily felt
immediately, nor are they always localized to the source of pollution,
it is incumbent upon the international community to negotiate
multilateral solutions to jointly combat environmental degradation.
116
Multilateralism is important for at least three reasons.
First,
unilateralism is not legally viable under customary international law
or under the GATT 1994 and the WTO multilateral trade
117
agreements. Second, multilateralism is optimal to protect resources
in the global commons, as unilateral approaches rarely resolve the
118
underlying problem.
And finally, “multilateralism, in contrast to
unilateralism, is a rules-based, not power-based approach to
119
international relations.”
Relying on multilateral negotiations and
efforts will allow Members to properly proceed in the face of
114. Zhao, supra note 71, at 62.
115. Most notable has been the adoption of principles featuring trade and the environment
in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development at the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). See UNCED, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
116. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 68.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.

Skinner_final_cpxns.doc

266

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

2/22/2010 4:06:49 PM

Vol. 20:245

uncertainty. Though Members are not required to wait for scientific
certainty before acting, a Member should not hastily respond to
environmental problems without some understanding of the
economic and social costs of unilaterally imposed measures that could
create a global patchwork of different environmental standards and
essentially freeze international trade.
IV. RECONCILIATION THROUGH SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement recognizes that all
Members should be permitted to expand the production of and trade
in goods and services, and allows for use of the world’s resources, but
explains that the use be “in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
120
economic development . . . .”
The objective of sustainable development is the merging of
environmental values and economic development—however,
previous WTO cases suggested that environmental values did not
121
accommodate the “needs and concerns” of developing countries. In
2006, Brazil – Tyres became the first WTO dispute initiated by a
developed country addressing a trade-restrictive measure introduced
by a developing country that was also designed to achieve
environmental goals. In previous cases, the AB restricted developed
country WTO Members from imposing their environmental standards
on developing country WTO Members without first considering the
conditions of those members or their ability to comply with the
122
standards in question.
“The Appellate Body has thus recognized
that some environmental measures originate from states that have
high standards of environmental protection, reflecting both the
strength of those states’ economies and their corresponding
123
technological and financial ability to adhere to such standards.” In
Brazil – Tyres, the critical issue is a mirror image of previous cases: a
developing country sought to impose restrictions on developed
countries for environmental and health concerns.
120. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., U.S. – Tuna I, supra note 11.
122. Kevin R. Gray, International Decisions: Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of
Retreated Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, World Trade Organization Appellate Body, December 3,
2007, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 610, 612 (2008) (citing U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 8, ¶¶ 161-63).
123. Id.
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The case involved a Brazilian import ban on used tires, leading to
a challenge by the European Community (EC). The rationale
underlying the ban prompted the EC to call for a WTO panel to
determine whether the measures were an improper invocation of
article XX and were unduly restrictive. As part of Brazil’s obligations
to fellow members of the Mercado Coman del Sur (Mercosur),
Brazilian courts exempted member states of the Mercosur Agreement
124
from the import ban.
The discretionary exemption and court
injunctions were the basis for the AB’s decision determining that the
ban arbitrarily discriminated between Mercosur and non-Mercosur
States. It concluded that the import ban could not discriminate
between States and suggested that Brazil implement an absolute ban
on imported retreaded tires to come into compliance with its WTO
125
obligations.
The language of the decision suggests, however, that
developing countries could implement internal regulations as part of
a comprehensive plan of environmental protection and preservation.
The AB did agree, however, with the panel’s conclusion that the
measures were provisionally justified under article XX(b). The
measures were necessary because Brazil identified health and
environmental risks associated with used tire stockpiles because of
environmental health dangers caused by fire (“[t]ire fires can produce
massive quantities of mercury, benzene, and other cancer-causing
126
poisons” ) and increased incidents of mosquito-borne diseases
(discarded tire stockpiles are optimal mosquito breeding grounds
because of water stagnation). On appeal, the EC argued that the
accumulation of used tires was a matter of poor disposal and
127
collection, and ultimately poor management.
The AB disagreed
and reasoned that some “public health and environmental problems
are so complex that they can be addressed only through numerous
128
interacting measures, including an import ban . . . .”
In fact,
substituting alternative measures “would undermine the total policy
by ‘reducing the synergies between its components, as well as its total
129
effect’ . . . .”
It concluded that trade measures could be part of a
State’s larger environmental management scheme, within the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 242.
Id. ¶ 258.
Gray, supra note 122, at n.2.
See Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 157.
Gray, supra note 122, at 613 (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151).
Id. (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 172).
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sovereign discretion of the WTO Member, and outside the purview of
130
WTO dispute settlement.
Protection of the environment is a vital and important interest of
WTO members. To determine the ability of a State to implement
suggested alternative measures, the AB considered the unique
characteristics of Brazil as a developing country and did not accept
the EC’s assertion that there are less restrictive alternatives
131
reasonably available. Because it would not be economically viable
to implement the alternatives in Brazil, the suggested measures are
not in fact available. “The Appellate Body ruled that a country’s
‘capacity . . . to implement remedial measures that would be
particularly costly, or would require advanced technologies’ . . . can
132
be relevant to whether the alternatives are reasonably available.”
The AB further clarified that an environmental regime does not
require the elimination of risks but merely that the restrictive
measure was “apt to produce a material contribution to the
133
achievement of its objective.”
The Brazil – Tyres decision emphasized the Marrakesh
Agreement’s recognition of countries “at different levels of economic
development” and their respective “needs and concerns” regarding
134
pursuit of a comprehensive program of sustainable development.
This case effectively reconciled the tension between development and
environmental protection specifically with respect to waste
production. Brazil – Tyres signifies the WTO’s commitment to
sustainable development and its respect for individualized programs
of environmental protection under broader multilateral agreements
addressing environmental protection and preservation. The WTO is
on its way to greening its jurisprudence with the assistance of the
international community.
135

CONCLUSION: CONSOLING THE LORAX
136

The Seussian paradigm in The Lorax illustrates the friction
between development and environmentalism.

130. Id. at 613.
131. See Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 209.
132. Gray, supra note 122, at 613 (citing Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 171).
133. Brazil – Tyres, supra note 15, ¶ 151.
134. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 3, at 9.
135. For a broader discussion, see generally Armin Rosencranz, Lex & The Lorax: Enforcing
Environmental Norms under International Law: The Origin and Emergence of International
Environmental Norms, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 309 (2003).
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The Once-ler and Lorax each crusade for competing values, but
this is not necessarily the world developing today. Though tensions
exist between competing trade values, multilateral agreements are
generally the accepted course of action to reconcile differences and
encourage global response to environmental degradation. In order to
effectively engage the international trade community, environmental
interests should participate in national and international trade policy
debates and should not ostracize governments or disregard the WTO
137
system.
Establishing an independent body or court will not
necessarily be internationally accepted, thereby limiting its
jurisdiction, and may be seen as a competing body hampering
138
development and trade.
Because any environmental regulations
will inherently have trade restrictive effects, a multilateral
environmental agreement should be conscious of the framework and
obligations under the WTO System and work within that system to
achieve desirable results; otherwise a measure that is provisionally
justified under a multilateral environmental agreement may be struck
down for wide-reaching economically unsustainable effects.
Moreover, few environmental agreements have incorporated an
enforcement mechanism or dispute settlement body that is already
accustomed to the interwoven values and policy rationales underlying
trade restrictive measures.
The WTO, because of its amenability and application of
interpretive sources of law, including multilateral environmental
agreements, is an optimal arena for encouraging sustainable
development. Moreover, the reasonable concerns of developing
countries are adequately addressed in the WTO system, and the
GATT rules provide exceptions for environmental protection, but
limit disguised restrictions to international trade. Finally, the WTO
accounts for the conditions of developing countries and does not
require installation of or investment in unreasonable measures in
those countries. The WTO may not be the most protective
organization of non-trade values, but it is the optimal system to
integrate competing concerns and advocate on behalf of sustainable
development.
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